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Introduction 
The payment of human subjects is an area where 
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) have wide discre-
tion. Although the “Common Rule”1 requires the pro-
vision of full information to human research partici-
pants to secure valid consent, the Rule is silent on the 
issue of payment.2 Still, some federal agencies offer 
guidance on the matter. For example, the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) cautions that high pay-
ments for risky research “may induce a needy par-
ticipant to take a risk that they normally would pre-
fer not to take.”3 For research under its purview, the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance pro-
vides that “[a]dvertisements may state that subjects 
will be paid, but should not emphasize the payment 
or the amount to be paid, by such means as larger 
or bold type.”4 One might read the FDA guidance to 
permit the advertisement for human subjects to state 
the specific amount of payment, as long as it is not 
emphasized. 
While there is a larger debate about whether and 
how human subjects should be paid, we focus on the 
permissibility of investigators advertising the amount 
of compensation that they intend to pay human sub-
jects. Can a pre-recruitment postcard offer a patient 
$50 to complete a survey? May a sign on a public bus 
mention that the study will pay up to $2,500? Poten-
tial research participants must decide whether to 
answer the phone or whether to show up at a screen-
ing site, and they may utilize such payment informa-
tion to inform those decisions. These preliminary 
decisions are made prior to the formal consent stage 
of research, where complete information about risks 
and benefits is provided.
For both practical and ethical reasons, recruitment 
is a sensitive stage of research. In practical terms, the 
initial solicitations are important for recruiting an 
appropriate and unbiased sample, without excessive 
delay.5 On the other hand, IRBs may seek to regulate 
disclosure about payment to protect human subjects 
from being unduly influenced by money, which may 
prevent them from fairly evaluating the risks of par-
ticipation.6 On this view, people might actually make 
better initial decisions about whether to pursue a 
research opportunity if they were blinded to payment 
information. Nonetheless, such a ban runs against 
the grain of other bioethical imperatives for informed 
decision making.7 
In this sensitive domain, it is unknown how IRBs 
have responded to the discretion allowed by the Com-
mon Rule and the guidance given by the FDA. In par-
ticular, have IRBs developed policies about whether 
researchers are allowed to provide precise payment 
information for study participation in recruitment 
materials? Prior research has shown heterogeneity 
across IRBs on a variety of other matters,8 but it is dif-
ficult to know whether these variations reflect differ-
ences in policy or differences in how IRBs handle cases 
presented. Examination of positive rules, rather than 
outcomes of cases, may shed light on that question. 
In this paper, we investigate IRB policies on dis-
closing the amount of compensation in recruitment 
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materials from the top 100 institutions by receipt of 
NIH funding in 2012. We find wide heterogeneity, and 
conclude by recommending a uniform national policy 
permitting such disclosures.
Background
Much of the literature on payment for human sub-
jects consists of a debate about the ethics of making 
any payment at all, and whether payment should be 
characterized as “compensation,” an “incentive,” or as a 
“benefit” to the subject.9 Ruth Grant and Jeremy Sug-
arman likely represent a scholarly consensus on the 
permissibility of using incentives in human subjects 
research: 
Incentives can be used to recruit subjects in 
many situations without any ethical qualms 
where all other ethical criteria are met — that 
is to say, incentives themselves are not the ethi-
cal problem here, generally speaking.… We have 
argued that incentives become problematic when 
conjoined with the following factors, singly or 
in combination with one another. Where the 
subject is in a dependency relationship with 
the researcher, where the risks are particularly 
high, where the research is degrading, where 
the participant will only consent if the incen-
tive is relatively large because the participant’s 
aversion to the study is strong, and where the 
aversion is a principled one — when these condi-
tions are present, the use of incentives is highly 
questionable.10
Some have argued that in order to treat research par-
ticipants justly, they should be viewed as wage labor-
ers, which arguably protects their “moral interests,” 
but also allows researchers to use compensation as a 
recruitment tool.11 
Other scholars argue that compensating research 
participants can “seduce” individuals into participat-
ing in research when they may otherwise not.12 This 
is a concern of many IRB members and researchers 
who worry that payments or providing health care 
can unduly influence potential research subjects.13 
In a survey of human subjects protection profession-
als, Emily Largent and colleagues found more com-
fort with reimbursing research subjects’ expenses 
incurred to participate in a study and for compensat-
ing subjects for their time; there was substantially 
less support for payment as an incentive or compen-
sation for risk.14 The authors hypothesize that IRB 
professionals prefer subjects to volunteer for a study 
for altruistic reasons,15 but contend that there is no 
real difference between payment for reimbursement 
and compensation and payment as an incentive from 
the perspective of a potential research subject.16 As a 
matter of principle, Largent and colleagues argue that 
“payment never coerces” and that “payment raises 
ethical concerns about the validity of consent only 
when it unduly influences participants by distorting 
their perception of research risks and benefits. In the 
absence of evidence that such distortions occur, IRBs 
should be reluctant to conclude that offers of payment 
undermine the validity of consent.”17 
The findings of another empirical study indicate 
that payments do increase individuals’ willingness 
to participate in research, as traditional econom-
ics would expect.18 Empirical research has, however, 
failed to substantiate the claim that payment infor-
mation causes irrational choices in human subjects 
research.19 In fact, scholars have found that offers of 
compensation made subjects more perceptive about 
risks.20 
Prior research has also shown that studies vary 
considerably as to how much they pay for similar bur-
dens. One study examined the research participant 
payment amount and consent forms of 467 studies at 
eleven IRBs and determined that there is significant 
variation in research subject payment practices (e.g., 
amount of payment) and no clear explanation for dif-
ferences between studies, between IRBs, and within 
studies and IRBs.21 Following up on unanswered 
questions, a survey of researchers and IRB chairper-
sons was conducted to determine what factors influ-
ence the decisions to offer payment to research par-
ticipants and to determine payment amounts. They 
found that the most important reason for payment is 
“compensation,” but that reimbursement for expenses, 
a token of appreciation, and incentives for participat-
ing also matter.22 Similarly, prior research with human 
subjects has shown that they view the prospect of pay-
ment as an important, material factor in their decision 
to pursue a research opportunity.23 
Much less scholarship has focused on the precise 
question of whether the amount of compensation 
should be advertised to subjects deciding whether to 
pursue an opportunity to participate. Katrina Bramst-
edt reiterates the FDA guidance that “[a]dvertising 
study remuneration is not unethical as long as it is 
not highlighted or emphasized causing it to stand out 
from other concepts in the advertisement.”24 In her 
review of studies in a clinical trial database (which 
potential subjects use to find opportunities to par-
ticipate in studies), Bramstedt found that “[s]pecific 
compensation (e.g., dollar amount) for study partici-
pation was mentioned in 56 (47%) of 119 advertise-
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ments.”25 Bramstedt expressed concern that some 
studies unethically put too much emphasis on the 
compensation, contrary to the guidance provided by 
the FDA. Bramstedt advises that both IRBs and data-
base organizers (because some IRBs approve unethi-
cal advertisements) monitor and approve descriptions 
of research on the databases.26 
In another study, researchers examined nine uni-
versities, along with 23 other research organizations 
(drug companies, contract research organizations, 
and independent IRBs), to characterize their policies 
regarding paying research subjects.27 Surprisingly, the 
majority of the organizations in their sample did not 
have written guidelines. In regards to payment, just 
under half of the organizations in the sample restrict 
how payment can appear in advertisements, and four 
of the organizations do not permit the amount to be 
placed in recruitment materials, although the mate-
rials may specify that subjects will be paid.28 It is 
unclear whether such variation in IRB policies exists 
on a larger scale.
The normative debate about paying human research 
subjects tends to be conclusory when it comes to the 
question of advertising compensation amounts. For 
instance, while Christine Grady asserts that “[a]n 
IRB should also review the presentation of informa-
tion about payment in consent documents as well as 
related advertisements and information sheets,” she 
does not provide suggestions about advertising and 
recruitment, nor how IRBs should judge payment 
information on recruitment materials.29 And in Trisha 
Phillips’ critique of study advertisements that high-
light benefits of participation, she argues that “[t]he 
amount of money offered to subjects and the way in 
which the offer is presented is relevant to determin-
ing whether the quality of the consent is adequate,” 
but does not recommend any specific policies about 
advertising for IRBs to follow.30
No prior research study has characterized the poli-
cies of research institutions as they relate to the issue 
of advertising the amount of payment to human sub-
jects. Nor has any study examined potential associa-
tions between those policies and institutional char-
acteristics. This paper will address these gaps in the 
literature.
Methods
We downloaded from the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) website a list of the top 100 research institu-
tions by receipt of NIH funding in 2012. We used NIH 
funding as an inclusion criterion because it served as a 
rough proxy of the volume of human subjects research 
being performed at each institution. 
NIH funding is presumably skewed towards medi-
cal research, although non-medical research is also 
subject to the Common Rule and the purview of IRB 
policies. At the same time, some non-medical institu-
tions may receive sizeable amounts of NIH funding. 
We coded whether the institutions were medical cen-
ters or schools to determine whether there are differ-
ences in permissibility of advertising levels of com-
pensation by type of research institution. We took the 
NIH database entities at face value, although some 
institutions appeared to be comprehensive universi-
ties (which may include medical schools) and others 
appeared to be more specialized entities, themselves 
schools of medicine (or public health). Only those 
entities that explicitly referred to medicine in their 
name were coded as medical schools. We attempted to 
find the relevant IRB for each entity listed to code the 
appropriate policy.
We then recruited and trained two research assis-
tants (second- and third-year law students) to identify 
each institution’s website for its IRB and to search rel-
evant documents until they found a policy that regu-
lated or provided guidelines for advertisements or 
other recruitment materials for human subjects. The 
research assistants also provided links to the docu-
ment, and extracted the relevant text of the policy or 
guideline, along with a URL and citation. One of the 
authors (MW) also independently searched for the 
relevant documents. One author (MW) and the two 
research assistants independently coded all 100 insti-
tutions’ policy or guideline with regard to advertising 
the amount of compensation in recruitment materials. 
Coding instructions from one of the co-authors (CR) 
specified that coders were “to carefully distinguish 
No prior research study has characterized the policies of research institutions as 
they relate to the issue of advertising the amount of payment to human subjects. 
Nor has any study examined potential associations between those policies and 
institutional characteristics. This paper will address these gaps in the literature.
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between the recruitment/advertising stage and the 
informed consent stage…[and] please look carefully 
at the distinction between disclosing the amount of 
compensation, versus disclosing whether there will 
be any compensation.… We are focused on whether 
the researcher can say the specific amount of money 
involved.” Coders were given a six-level instrument, to 
specify whether each institution: 
1. prohibits such disclosures,
2. discourages them,
3.  has no stated policy (and thus implicitly 
allows them), 
4.  explicitly allows them, 
5. encourages them, or 
6. requires them.
 
See Table 1 below for examples of institutions that fell 
into these six categories of policies. 
A typical policy in level 3 is one that prohibits 
researchers from emphasizing the amount of pay-
ment, but fails to explicitly state that the amount of 
payment may be disclosed, as in the FDA guidance. We 
acknowledge that level 3’s notion of implicit allowance 
involves a step of inference. It is possible, instead, that 
IRB staffers at such institutions are themselves het-
erogeneous about how they handle investigator adver-
tisements. At the level of policy, however, we believe it 
sensible to characterize such institutions as “implicitly 
allowing” advertising the amounts of compensation.
Then, one of the co-authors (CR) reviewed all three 
primary coders’ excerpts and codes, and coded whether 
they were in numerical agreement, and if not, then 
resolved any discrepancies, explaining his decision in 
writing. After the first 55 institutions were quadruple-
coded in this way, the two authors then recoded all 
100 policies, in light of the prior codes, which revealed 
how the independent readers of the policy under-
stood it. In these final codes, the two authors were 
in agreement 84.88% of the time (kappa=.78), which 
indicates “substantial agreement” or high inter-rater 
reliability.31 
We then calculated frequencies for each of the six 
possible policy guidelines with regard to advertising 
the amount of compensation in recruitment materials 
in order to determine the extent of variation amongst 
IRBs. Because it was not possible to find information 
on the policies for 11 institutions (by internet searches 
or query emails sent from one of the research assistants 
to the particular IRB), only 89 institutions remain in 
the final sample. These eleven missing institutions are 
distinct from the institutions we coded as “level 3,” 
which had an accessible policy relating to advertising 
materials, but did not specifically address whether the 
amount of compensation could be stated therein.
Table 1
Codes with Examples of Institutions and Policy Language
Code Institution Policy Language
1. Prohibit
New York University School 
of Medicine
Researchers may not “specify exact monetary compensation amounts.” 
2. Discourage
University of Wisconsin 
Madison
“If participants will be paid for their time/effort, it is recommended that the 
wording ‘Compensation Available’ be used in recruitment materials, rather 
than specifying a specific amount.  Statements of payment should not be in 
larger type than the rest of the ad.”
3. Implicitly Allow
Harvard University School  
of Public Health
“THE ADVERTISEMENT: Does NOT emphasize the payment or the amount  
to be paid, by such means as larger or bold type” .
4. Explicitly Allow
University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill
“Any advertisement … may include, where appropriate:  A straightforward 
and truthful description of the incentives to the subject for participation in the 
study (e.g., payment).”
5. Encourage University of Pennsylvania
Recruitment materials should include the following information:  “a descrip-
tion of the compensation/reimbursement. Recruitment materials should NOT 
include…Overemphasis on compensation but should not emphasize the  
payment or the amount to be paid.” 
6. Require
Albert Einstein College of 
Medicine Yeshiva University
“If remuneration is offered, give actual or at least ball park amounts; e.g. up to.... 
Payment guidelines are available through the CCI/IRB administration offices.” 
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Results
Our review of the top 100 institutions found that the 
majority permit investigators to advertise the amount 
of compensation, but simply regulate the placing of 
undue emphasis on the amount of payment in recruit-
ment materials (such as by bolding or highlighting 
payment), a rule which parallels the FDA’s guidelines 
for human subjects research for filings before that 
agency. Table 2 summarizes our results. 
Of the 89 NIH-funded institutions in 2012 in our 
sample, 8 (8.99%) forbid investigators from disclosing 
the amount of compensation in recruitment materials; 
5 (5.62%) discourage disclosing the amount of com-
pensation; 45 (50.56%) implicitly allow disclosing the 
amount of compensation; 20 (22.47%) explicitly allow 
disclosing the amount of compensation; 9 (10.11%) 
encourage disclosing the amount of compensation; 
and, 2 (2.25%) mandate disclosing the amount of com-
pensation in recruitment materials. If we group insti-
tutions’ policies by rough valence, about 15% forbid or 
discourage disclosures; three quarters (73%) implicitly 
or explicitly allow; and 12% encourage or mandate. 
We analyzed whether there were differences by type 
of research institution as to whether researchers are 
permitted to advertise the amount of compensation to 
potential research participants. Specifically, we investi-
gated whether medical schools or centers would differ 
from other institutions (i.e., universities and colleges). 
There were 24 (26.97%) medical schools or centers 
in our sample institutions, and 65 (73.03%) institu-
tions that were not specialized as medical schools or 
centers. With 16.67% of medical schools forbidding or 
discouraging advertising compensation amounts, and 
13.84% of the other institutions doing so, we found no 
significant difference (χ2 (1)=0.1118, p=0.738). 
Additionally, we investigated whether the rank of insti-
tution by receipt of NIH funding was associated with 
institutional IRB policies. We divided the institutions in 
our sample into quartiles by annual funding, and found 
that the lower two quartiles of institutions in our sample 
are much more likely than the upper two quartiles to 
have policies that implicitly allow (level 3) advertising 
compensation (65.12% of institutions in the lower half 
of the sample have such a policy compared to 36.96% 
of institutions in the upper half). In contrast, the upper 
two quartiles are more likely to explicitly allow (level 4) 
advertising compensation than the lower two quartiles 
(34.78% compared to 9.3%). These differences are large 
and statistically significant (χ2(15)=25.936, p=0.039), 
although the practical distinction between implicit and 
explicit permission may be minor. When dichotomiz-
ing whether an institutional policy permits or does not 
permit advertising compensation, there is no significant 
difference between institutions by rank of NIH funding, 
however (χ2(3)=1.299, p=0.729).
Discussion
Our study has shown that there is substantial hetero-
geneity in IRB policies about specifying the amount of 
compensation in recruitment materials, with a signifi-
cant portion requiring or encouraging what another 
significant proportion forbids. On the whole, over 
85% of the research institutions in our sample permit 
such disclosure, but there is sizeable variation even 
amongst these institutions. The majority policy (level 
3, 51%) is in accordance with the FDA guidance docu-
ment’s silent permission, without imposing additional 
written specifications; however, the other half of 
institutions in the sample vary in some way from this 
guidance, either explicitly telling researchers they can 
specify the amount of compensation, recommending 
that researchers do so, recommending that research-
ers do not do so, or forbidding or mandating such 
disclosures. Almost equal percentages of institutional 
policies forbid and discourage such disclo-
sure as do encourage or require, forming a 
bell-shaped distribution of policies. 
It is unclear what explains or justi-
fies such variation. One could attempt to 
explain this heterogeneity in terms of an 
underlying heterogeneity in the facts on 
the ground. IRBs were originally designed 
as a system of local peer-review,32 and some 
argue that there remains a need for local 
IRBs to reflect local values and concerns.33 
It is possible that some institutions have 
overall more vulnerable populations than 
other institutions. If research in sensitive 
topical areas such as substance abuse and 
treatment or psychiatric conditions, or 
Table 2
Frequency and Percentages of IRB Policies on Advertising 
Compensation
Code Frequency Percent Cumulative  Percent
Prohibit 8 8.99 8.99
Discourage 5 5.62 14.61
Implicitly Allow 45 50.56 65.17
Explicitly Allow 20 22.47 87.64
Encourage 9 10.11 97.75
Mandate 2 2.25 100
Total 89 100
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research that recruits from populations such as the 
drug dependent, homeless, or mentally ill, were clus-
tered geographically, then local IRBs (e.g., those in 
large, urban areas) may develop distinctive policies 
to protect these populations. It is not clear, however, 
that the research performed and subjects recruited in 
the same major metropolitan area are so very different 
as to warrant research institutions in those areas hav-
ing different IRB policies, although this variation was 
found in our sample. 
If the heterogeneity in this particular IRB policy 
is not due to deliberative, well-considered choices 
reflecting local concerns or values, it may be that the 
variation in policies regulating research and purport-
ing to protect human subjects are a function of which 
institution happens to control, and perhaps which 
staff members happened to write, the relevant policy. 
It is possible that the human subject populations are 
not dissimilar, but instead that some universities have 
more paternalistic values than others.34
However, our study has also shown that the more 
elite institutions as measured by receipt of NIH fund-
ing are more likely to have policies that explicitly allow 
investigators to advertise the amount of compensation 
research subjects will receive. In contrast, the less elite 
institutions are more likely to adhere to the FDA guid-
ance on recruiting human subjects, implicitly allowing 
investigators to disclose compensation at the recruit-
ment phase of research. Still, such variation is rela-
tively inconsequential, compared to the differences at 
the poles, where some institutions forbid what others 
require.
Additionally, our study has demonstrated that 
there is no statistically significant difference between 
medical and non-medical research institutions as to 
whether advertising specific amounts of compensation 
is permitted by a particular IRB. It is likely that medi-
cal research has a greater degree of risk to the human 
subjects than social/behavioral science research, but 
such a distinction is not driving variance for this spe-
cific policy. Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-
Shea contend that because IRBs are set up to deal with 
medical research rather than social science research, 
IRB members “apply regulatory provisions to such 
research [field research] that are inappropriate to its 
own methodological presuppositions.”35
Recommendations
The federal government has recently acknowledged 
the need to reduce ambiguity and delay for investiga-
tors,36 something that is exacerbated by heterogeneity 
in IRB policies. We propose a way in which this het-
erogeneity in IRB policies about advertising amounts 
of compensation should be resolved. 
First, there should be a single rule about the permis-
sibility of advertising the amount of compensation in 
recruitment materials. The Common Rule is silent on 
this and many other matters, leaving local IRBs to fill 
in the gaps. Although IRBs need to be able to reflect 
local values and concerns,37 with regard to this par-
ticular policy, wide IRB discretion may be a sub-opti-
mal form of regulation. Current heterogeneity in such 
policies may impede multi-center research and hinder 
the movement of researchers across institutions, and 
may also consume scarce local resources in the efforts 
to make, disseminate, and enforce all these disparate 
rules. Additionally, heterogeneity in the substance of 
rules can create an appearance of arbitrariness, which 
may undermine the perceived legitimacy of human sub-
jects regulation, for both human subjects and research-
ers. The FDA’s guidance on advertising amounts of 
compensation does provide a focal point nationwide 
on this particular question. However, it does not apply 
outside the research that is within the FDA’s regulatory 
ambit, and it may be too vaguely worded to provide suf-
ficient direction about the permissibility of advertising 
amounts of compensation for research participation. 
Thus, although the FDA guidance seems to have cre-
ated a minor consensus, it is incomplete.
Second, we suggest that the single rule should 
explicitly permit investigators to disclose in recruit-
ment materials the specific amount of compensation 
There should be a single rule about the permissibility of  
advertising the amount of compensation in recruitment materials. The 
Common Rule is silent on this and many other matters, leaving local IRBs 
to fill in the gaps. Although IRBs need to be able to reflect local values and 
concerns, with regard to this particular policy, wide IRB discretion may be a 
sub-optimal form of regulation. 
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for study participation. Importantly, when there are 
significant risks to a study, they should also be dis-
closed in recruitment materials, alongside the amount 
of compensation, with similar emphasis. From the 
perspective of human subjects, these disclosures of 
material information should be allowed. Subjects 
need to give voluntary informed consent to par-
ticipate.38 However, as the FDA has recognized, the 
informed consent process actually begins at recruit-
ment.39 Recruitment is a key stage in the research pro-
cess in which the subject must make an initial decision 
about whether to pursue a given opportunity to partic-
ipate in research. Should she take the time to return a 
phone call, or click through a link, or respond to an ad 
in the newspaper, or even travel across town to attend 
an in-person screening? 
IRB policies that prohibit or discourage disclosures 
of the amount of compensation in recruitment materi-
als force potential participants to guess as to whether 
the amount of payment will make it worthwhile for 
them to invest their time and effort in a study. Such 
guesses as to the amount of payment are likely to 
be unreliable, creating both false positives and false 
negatives at this preliminary stage. Proscriptive IRB 
policies may result in uninformed refusals by persons 
who wrongly assume that the hidden payment will be 
too small to be worthwhile, and they also may result in 
preliminary uninformed decisions to pursue an oppor-
tunity by those who wrongly assume that the hidden 
payment will be high enough to be worthwhile. Relat-
edly, IRB policies that prohibit or discourage disclo-
sures of the amount of compensation in recruitment 
materials may unintentionally impose costs on the 
human subjects the IRB is trying to protect. Poten-
tial participants for whom compensation matters to 
their decision to participate in a study may spend time 
investigating a research study that they would have 
quickly declined participating in if they had known 
the amount of compensation. 
Moving to consider the perspectives and legitimate 
interests of researchers, disclosures about the amount 
of compensation for study participation should like-
wise be permitted. One might argue that investigators 
themselves have autonomy and academic freedom 
interests, deserving of consideration.40 Additionally, if 
a researcher proposes to use a particular mechanism 
for recruiting human subjects, that is a prima facie 
reason for supposing that the mechanism has instru-
mental value for scientific progress. For example, 
there are situations where researchers and research-
funders decide that offering a particularly generous 
level of compensation in an advertisement is required 
in order to recruit a sample that is representative of a 
difficult-to-reach population and sufficiently robust to 
avoid a selection bias. Of course, these investigators 
may be wrong, but IRBs owe some deference to the 
methodological expertise of their investigators.41 
Still, such IRB deference to investigators should not 
be absolute; the IRB process exists to superintend the 
research process in order to protect human subjects. 
Researchers face immense pressure in competition 
for research funding, and this may result in research 
recruitment designs that are less scientifically valid. 
This concern, however, can be allayed due to other 
parts of the IRB process. IRBs weigh scientific valid-
ity in assessing concerns for the welfare of human 
research subjects, and at least one IRB member needs 
to have scientific expertise.42 Prior research has shown 
that many of the biomedical scientists on IRB com-
mittees scrutinize the proposed research for scientific 
merit.43 If the research is not scientifically valid or 
increases risks relative to benefits, then the IRB can 
deny approval. 
Therefore, there is no need for a blanket rule pro-
hibiting disclosures of payment information; IRBs 
can instead request that researchers justify their pay-
ment amounts and recruitment materials in their 
request for research approval, and IRBs can determine 
whether the payments are likely to exert undue influ-
ence. To the extent that the IRB is concerned that the 
amount of compensation will be an undue influence, 
the IRB can require that it be reduced or may preclude 
investigators from giving it inappropriate emphasis 
in recruitment materials. IRBs may also require that 
such information be balanced by information about 
the risks of the research. Moreover, potential subjects 
will learn more about the risks during the informed 
consent stage, blunting the concern that they would 
be somehow unduly or inappropriately influenced.
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